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Intelligence Information Report

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REPORT CLASS SECRET/WINTEL [Redacted]

COUNTRY Hungary/Warsaw Pact

SUBJECT Offensive Operations of the Coalition Front and Combined Arms Army

[Redacted]

Summary:

This report is a translation of an article in Honvedelem [National Defense], No 6, 1980, official publication of the Hungarian People's Army, with an overall classification of SECRET. The report, entitled "Characteristics of Organizing and Conducting an Offensive Operation of the Coalition Front and Combined Arms Army," discusses nuclear and conventional warfare possibilities in the European theaters of operations, planning the functions of the operational maneuver group and its role in offensive and defensive operations. Principles of coastal strategic operations against seaborne and airborne assault landings are discussed.

Dissem: Field: None.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION
OF THE COALITION FRONT AND COMBINED ARMS ARMY
by Maj Gen Tibor ((Toth))

In a future world war, if the forces of aggression succeed in unleashing it, the imperialist bloc will find itself confronted with the community of socialist nations and the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, which operate in accordance with uniform strategic principles. The theses of the strategy, in the function of doctrinal views, are constantly revised, modernized and modified with development in progress and anticipated in technical and economic fields. This enhances the coalitional character of command and conduct of the war. In the coalition system the continued technical development of the national armies is attained by relying upon joint technical and military potential, with special consideration of the trends and pace of enemy military preparations planned and in progress.

In consequence of the development of modern combat and control technology significant changes have also occurred in the content of military activities. The nuclear war of the future is thus conceivable as a system of strategic operations and actions conducted with the participation of all military forces and under a uniform concept and command. The tasks to be accomplished--that is, the strategic actions of the armed forces--are dissimilar from each other. As Attachment 1 illustrates, we can thus speak about:

- actions of strategic nuclear forces;
- strategic operations conducted in the continental theaters of operations;
- strategic operations conducted in naval theaters of operations;
- repulsion of enemy air and space attacks;
- current air operations in the continental as well as naval theaters (open spaces).

Henceforth, we will be concerned in more detail with some of the more important questions of the coalition front and army offensive operations occurring within the continental theaters of operations by considering the potentialities of the southwestern theater's forest-mountain environs.


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
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Considering that in 1976 and 1978 within the advanced training framework of the Ministry of National Defense we elaborated the problems of the front offensive operation, likewise in 1978 at the Scientific Conference of the Hungarian People's Army [HPA] we elaborated in detail the combined arms army offensive operation in forested mountain terrain. Let us also call attention, therefore, to these key questions, and to new and recently arising questions.

Before the discussion of key questions of a front and army offensive operation, it would be advisable to consider the given theater of operations and the characteristics arising from its natural geographic potentialities.

Some of the More Important Features of the Southwest (SW) Theater of Operations as well as of the Forested Mountain Regions

1. Major Features of the SW Theater of Operations

Europe, as a war area, is divided into three theaters: Northwest, West, and Southwest.

The SW Theater of Operations (its land area) includes the southern part of Central Europe, Southern Europe (excluding the Pyrenees [sic] Peninsula), the SW regions of the Soviet Union, the Asia Minor peninsular area, and coastal areas of North Africa. In this theater we shall find the Italian strategic axis touching us more closely in the general direction of Budapest-Udine-Genoa, and basically including Hungary and Czechoslovakia's southeast region, Yugoslavia's northwest region, Austria, and Northern Italy. Attachment 4 illustrates the division of the Italian strategic axis.

The Alps, extending 1,200 km in the shape of a crescent from the Mediterranean Sea (at the western perimeter of the Gulf of Genoa) to the Danube Valley, will profoundly affect military operations.

On the Italian strategic axis--taking into consideration observations of exercises of the past 8 years--we can count on Austrian military forces, perhaps parts of the 2d or other West German Corps and--differing territorially and in time--the 3d, 4th, and possibly the 5th Corps. Initially these forces may represent 10 to 12 divisions, 80 to 100 missile launchers of various types and guns capable of firing nuclear weapons, approximately 1,000 tanks, approximately 2,000 guns and mortars, and 500 tactical aircraft (including 100 strike aircraft).

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2. Some Major Features of the Forested Mountain Regions and Their Influence on the Probable Activity of the Potential Enemy as well as on the Employment of Our Own Forces

At the most recent (1978) Scientific Conference of the HPA we studied this theme thoroughly, therefore we shall limit ourselves only to the essence of the conclusions formulated at the Conference. (Conference material appeared in full in Honvedelem 1/1979.)

The characteristics of the planning and command of military operations (combat actions) conducted in forested mountain regions derive primarily from the geographic features of these regions.

Particularly significant among them are:

- vast regions, criss-crossed, of varying differences in level and, for the most part, covered with vegetation;
- a scanty network of roads predominantly following the mountain chains and valleys;
- fast flowing river barriers of fluctuating water levels;
- mountain passes passable only for a few months due to heavy snowfalls;
- large numbers of easily destructible manmade objects (bridges, viaducts, tunnels);
- rapidly changing climatic conditions (sudden downpours, thunderstorms, snowstorms, fogs, avalanches and glaciers).

The geographic factors with particular influence on the use of all enemy as well as of all [our] own forces are by no means listed with a claim to completeness; the essence of these factors can be summed up as follows:

a) Concerning the Potential Enemy:

It is a generalized observation of the exercises that the potential enemy, NATO forces exploiting favorable terrain features and relying on the defensive activities of covering forces, will create strong strike concentrations for each axis and endeavors to smash our main forces functioning on given axes, in border clashes or, failing that, will shift to defense in already designated (built-up) terrain sectors and areas. In case of penetration of defense by counterattacks (counterstrikes) the enemy will try to slow down and contain the offensive concentration by defending intervening defensive terrain sectors, more important road junctions, crossings and passes, and he will try to gain the initiative by moving fresh troops forward and committing them to battle.

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Forested mountain terrain creates favorable conditions for the potential enemy--Austrian forces--to create a solid defense independently and isolatedly with a relatively small force, and to multilaterally pindown, wear down, and delay the offensive with fire and destruction by continuous action.

The most basic conclusion of NATO and other exercises conducted in forested mountain regions is that the WP Combined Armed Forces must contend with a well-prepared, experienced, strong, and active adversary effectively exploiting favorable features of the terrain.


b) Concerning the Employment of Own Forces:

The natural geographic properties of the forested mountain regions, as well as the probable combat procedures of the enemy operating there place special requirements on the mode of combat as opposed to the organization and combat technology of the forces, and the organization and command of the offensive operation and combat. Among these special requirements the most significant are:

- offensive operations progress on isolated operational and tactical axes, independently and separate from each other by high mountain chains;
- the breadth of the offensive zone of line units and larger units grows significantly; meanwhile, the width of axes suitable for continuing combat action in the battle order is strongly restricted;
- the expansion of forces depth increases considerably. On the basis of the observation of several exercises, the depth of the regiment can reach 40 km, of the division 70 to 100 km, and of the army several hundred kilometers, which involves various command, combat support, supply, and other problems;
- maneuver with forces and means, forward movement of reserves and second echelons, and their deployment to combat or action is difficult, since their employment can generally only come about by way of the combat formation units in the first echelon;
- combat support and direct support of the operational-combat formation of columns and rear services require extra attention;
- continuous defense of various constructions (bridges, viaducts, tunnels, etc.), highways, railway junctions, mountain passes, crossings, as well as control of the road and railroad nets ties down significant forces.

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Fundamentals of Offensive Military Operations of the
Coalition Front and Combined Arms Army

The ground forces form the basis of the front as an operational-strategic formation. Its function is operational and strategic, in certain cases, the execution of strategic missions on one strategic or several operational axes in the ground theater of operations. The front performs its mission with the ground forces formations and tactical airforce strength, in joint operation with other armed forces units and large units. The operation of the front is an organic part of the ongoing strategic action in the theater of operations.

1. The Role and Position of the Front and Combined Arms Army in a Strategic Operation

The role of the front (army) depends upon:

- the concept of strategic maneuvers and operations;
- the dimensions of application of mass destruction weapons;
- the substantive content of a mission;
- its place in strategic maneuvers and operations;
- its strength and strategic capabilities;
- the conditions of joint operation with neighboring countries and other armed forces;
- other factors (the potential of the theater of operations, economic and political conditions, etc.).

Missions arising from that concept shall determine the place of the front in ongoing strategic maneuvers in the theater of operations. The front may carry out an offensive operation in the strategic first echelon of a ground [forces] concentration participating in an ongoing strategic maneuver in the theater of operations but it may form the second echelon on the main and secondary strategic axes including the littoral axis and mountainous regions. In the course of a strategic maneuver--depending upon the established situation--the position of the front is subject to change. The army can attack in the first or second echelon of the front and may occasionally form an operational maneuver group.

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2. Strength of the Front and the Combined Arms Army

The strength of the front and the combined arms army is not fixed; it depends upon the mission, the established situation, the importance of the axis and its operational capacities, and the front's effective strength will generally be of a coalitional composition, i.e., multinational.

The coalition-strength front is a strategic-operational formation of the WP Combined Armed Forces, in the effective strength of which various multinational formations, large units, and units belonging to the alliance function, and the command of which--on the basis of a uniform operational art, and technical and organizational characteristics--is represented in one person by the front commander. He is also responsible for party-political and personnel work, disciplinary and legal activity, material-technical support, and retention of the national system of personnel compensation.

The coalition character typical of the front also usually covers the combined arms army in its composition. Considering our relations, binational forces--Soviet and Hungarian--can operate in a coalition front and army.

The activities of front missile units, air forces, and other forces on behalf of the army significantly expand the coalition character.

In the SW Theater of Operations one to three combined arms armies, one or two corps, a few reserve divisions, one or two missile brigades, air defense missile brigades and regiments, and large units and units of various branches of arms may comprise the effective strength of the front. Tactical and strike aircraft (army aviation) may also be included in the front composition.

The composition of tactical aircraft may include two or three fighter divisions, one or two fighter bomber divisions, one bomber division, and reconnaissance, transportation and auxiliary air (helicopter) units and subunits.

The composition of strike aircraft (army aviation) may include combat, transportation, and multipurpose helicopter (air) units and subunits.

The missions of the tactical air force are performed under the direct command of the front commander or the tactical air command and its staff. The missions of the strike air force are performed for the most part under the subordination of the combined arms army.

Airborne landing, long-range and military transport air large units (and units), as well as parts of the naval forces and river flotillas may also participate (as determined by the theater commander) in the front operation.

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The combined arms army may include initially four to six army divisions, one or two tank divisions, an operational-tactical missile brigade, army aviation, one artillery brigade, one or two separate antitank artillery brigades, one air defense electronic reconnaissance battalion, one engineer brigade, one ponton-bridge regiment, one assault-crossing battalion, armed forces branch and technical units and subunits, as well as institutes [inchezet].

The army can be reinforced by two or three artillery brigades, some antitank battalions, and other armed forces units and special units.

For offensive operations the army can receive 50 to 60 nuclear and 40 to 50 conventional missiles with cassette warheads.

The front can support the army forces by the deployment of 1 or 2 fighter, 8 to 10 fighter-bomber, and 1 or 2 bomber regiments. In support of the army, the higher unit may also employ 15 to 20 nuclear weapons, depending on the capability.

3. The Objectives and Missions of Front and Combined Arms Army Offensive Operations

The front offensive operation is the totality of operations, engagements, battles, strikes, and maneuvers coordinated according to objective, mission, time, and place and accomplished, on the basis of a unified concept and plan, in joint operation with formations and large units of the air force, the national air defense, and the navy for the purpose of destroying the enemy and seizing his territory on a specified strategic-operational axis.

The objective of the front offensive operation is the destruction of enemy nuclear means; dispersion in full depth of the opposing army group's tactical formation; dispersion of advancing strategic operational reserves; and seizure of important terrain sectors, areas, and installations. This will deprive the enemy of his capabilities of acquiring (from overseas) mobilization, supplementary and new reserves, and also deprive the enemy of his air force landing and missile unit disposition areas. Consequently, the penetration of enemy resistance and stability would be within reach and favorable conditions would be produced for the achievement of operational goals or the further continuation of operations. Achievement of the objective of the first offensive operation can coincide with a nearby strategic operation in progress in the theater of operations. In its content the objective of the combined arms army offensive operation is similar to that of the front, but is more limited in its dimensions.

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The missions of the front and the combined arms army and the dimensions of the military operations are illustrated in Attachment 5.

The immediate objective of the front is destruction of enemy nuclear means, dispersion of the opposing operational (army group) concentration, seizure of enemy areas and terrain sectors which render the disorganization of the strategic defense attainable, and creation of favorable conditions for the development of the offensive. The depth of the mission is 200 to 300 km and coincides with the first echelon armies' secondary objective; its time span is 10 to 15 days.

The secondary objective of the front is destruction of newly discovered enemy nuclear means, dispersion of his immediate strategic-operational reserves, and seizure of such targets whereby the operational goal is attainable. The depth of the mission is 250 to 300 km and its time span some 10 to 12 days.

The immediate objective of the army is destruction of enemy nuclear means, dispersion of the main forces of army corps existing in the enemy operational first echelon, dispersion of his nearby operational reserves, and seizure of those areas and installations, the loss of which will disrupt operational stability and assure favorable conditions for the successful development of the offensive. The mission's depth is 100 to 150 km and its time span is 5 to 8 days.

The army secondary objective is destruction of newly discovered nuclear means of the enemy, completion of the dispersion of opposing enemy concentrations, and seizure of such important areas as will assure the achievement of the operational objective. Its depth is 100 to 150 km (measuring from the terrain sector of the first objective) and its time span is 5 to 7 days.

The first day tasks are designed to support effective preparation of army operations and detailed development of coordination.

4. Tactical Order of Battle of the Front and of the Combined Arms Army

One of the key requirements of a successful military operation is the creation of the front (army) tactical order of battle, which is no more than the grouping of forces according to missions and axes. Out of this grouping, on the axis of the main strike, and for fulfillment of the main mission, emerges the battle group. On the secondary and other axes the grouping of forces serves the task of flanks, support troops, and cover security.

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The front (army) order of battle includes:

- the first and second echelons, the operational maneuver group [OMG], the combined arms reserves;
- concentrations of rocket and artillery forces, tactical and army air forces, air defense forces, air and naval assault groupings;
- antitank reserves, the mobile barrier detachment, branch troops, front (army) rear services, as well as temporarily committed elements.

As compared to previous experience among the cited operational elements, two elements appear new; the mission of others is unchanged.

a) The presence of the OMG in the tactical order of battle and in the offensive operation of the front and army is justified, in the event nuclear means are used, by the efforts to exploit the effects of nuclear strikes as soon as possible by troops attacking from the front. Similarly, in the event of use of conventional weapons, the efforts to exploit gaps in the enemy tactical depth, disorganize his tactical command, rear support, and maneuver capability, destroy his nuclear means, intensify the pace of the offensive, and attain expediently the operational objective, also explain the presence of the OMG in front and army offensive operational and tactical order of battle.

The general missions of the front and combined arms army OMG include: exploitation of the effects of nuclear strikes and gaps arising in the enemy tactical order of battle; engagement, at fast pace, in combat with the enemy forces; participation in action alongside the increased support of the air force; and disengagement from the main body of forces and acceleration of the pace of the offensive. Additional missions include penetration of enemy defenses behind the cover of the advance detachment and destruction, by so-called "maneuverable" operations extending to all or part of the dynamic front or army offensive zone, such important enemy installations as operational command posts, nuclear means, storage facilities, aircraft on airfields; seizure of bridges at the more important water barriers; linkup with operational paratroops; and exploitation of favorable political and military changes in the enemy rear areas (establish contact with resistance or partisan groups, etc.).

The strength of the front OMG can expand from one reinforced tank or motorized rifle division to a tank or combined arms army. In certain cases, the OMG can be formed from tank or motorized divisions (2 or 3 divisions) under the command of a unified operational-tactical (corps) headquarters.

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In the case of the initial offensive operation the front OMC is located behind the first-echelon armies, to a depth of 100 to 200 km from the front line, and can usually be committed to battle after achievement of the first echelon immediate objective. The extent of its disengagement from the main front forces, assuming favorable conditions in the theater of operations, may reach 80 to 100 km; the momentum of advance, however, is 80 to 100 km per day.

The strength of the combined arms army OMC as an independent element can expand from a reinforced tank or motorized rifle regiment (primarily equipped with the BMP) to a division. In the initial situation it is located behind the first echelon divisions of the combined arms army, 50 to 60 km from the front line, and can generally be committed to battle on the second or third day of operations. The extent of its disengagement from the main forces of the army can reach 50 to 70 km and its momentum of advance, 30 to 50 or more km. In relation to us it can be employed where the terrain permits. Thus, it can be created at the time of organization of the operation or in the course of it; however, it must prepare for its mission thoroughly.

In the planning period of the operation, it is expedient to determine at least two terrain sectors for the commitment to action of the front and the combined arms army. Preceding the commitment to action of the OMC--inasmuch as the operation takes place with the employment of nuclear means--it is advisable to execute nuclear strikes against enemy nuclear means, airfields, reserves, and other important targets. In the event of use of conventional means the enemy's destruction is to be accomplished by integrated fire. In the course of the OMC deployment and action, it is practical to focus the efforts of the tactical and strike air forces on achievement of air superiority, continuous support of the OMC operation, and neutralization of advancing enemy reserves.


The working out of front and combined arms army OMC support and utilization problems in theory and practice of the art of war is, in turn, a continuing mission. In this matter further wide-ranging research and acquisition of experience in the course of exercises are necessary.

b) Present as a new element at the front is the tactical air force instead of the air army, and in the army tactical order of battle, the concept of army aviation forces is new.

In the composition of the above may be combat, fire support, transport and multipurpose helicopter units, subunits, as well as aviation subunits; various air reconnaissance subunits may also be included. They are used for combat support of ground forces, and various transportation and command support tasks.

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5. Preparation and Execution of the Offensive Operation of the Front and the Combined Arms Army

Information relating to the preparation and conduct of the offensive operation does not differ from the information thus far; however, in some areas, at present, missions must be prepared with greater thoroughness.

It is necessary to consider the possibilities of using nuclear or conventional mass destruction means fundamentally in the course of planning. The operations can be initiated or proceed by either restricted or mass use of nuclear weapons, or under conditions of using only conventional means. The destructive means used have a decisive influence on the methods of conduct and of necessity upon the full outcome of the operation.

a) The nuclear weapon is the principal means of the enemy's destruction. In order that it reach its objective on decisive axes, it must be used en masse on reliably detected targets and coordinated with other destructive means.

Nuclear weapons may be used at the outset of the operation, or in the course of it. Nuclear weapons will be employed in the first and subsequent nuclear strikes.

The first nuclear strike is of decisive importance, since 40 to 50 percent or more of available nuclear means may be used.

b) In the course of an operation conducted with conventional means the army mechanized infantry (tank) large units (units), in addition to the fire support of the tactical and army air forces as well as of the artillery, will carry out the principal missions.

The necessary forces and means advantage can be created by narrowing the offensive zone and by concentration of forces and effective fire in scattered disposition.

Dispersion of the enemy and seizure of his territory in combat action waged by conventional means can be realized by:

- penetration of the defense;
- a meeting engagement;
- in-depth development of the offensive;
- averting counterattack and pursuit.

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c) Destruction of the enemy by integrated fire is a recently raised question in strategy. Its essence, organized at the operational level, is integrated effective fire levelled at the enemy according to a unified concept and plan, which [effective fire] includes every type of artillery fire, tank and motorized rifle fire, air force strikes, and employment of explosive obstacles [minefields] and incendiary weapons. The actual destruction of the enemy by integrated fire is usually divided into four stages from the army down, namely:

- fire support of advancing troops;
- preparatory fire for the assault;
- support of the assault by fire;
- close fire support of the attack.

Fire support of advancing forces can begin with the troops leaving the departure area and may last until the commencement of preparatory fire. (Depending on the situation, it may be omitted.) This is a new phase made necessary because the enemy introduced large long-range weapons capable of impeding forward troop movement. Artillery gun and rocket-launcher troops, and front and army aviation can participate in fire support.

Preparatory fire for the assault may begin when the troops are deployed in battalion columns and may be terminated by the troops moving out to the terrain sectors of the assault. The artillery takes part in the preparatory fire for the assault from covered firing positions and by direct fire. In addition, tanks, PSzH [armored transport vehicles], and BMP [APC's], as well as infantry automatic weapons, may also take part in the preparatory fire. The front and army air forces participate by conducting strikes against previously detected targets; the strikes are mainly outside the range of effective artillery fire.

Assault fire support may extend from the terrain sector of the assault-- depending on the enemy defense grouping--to the depth of a battalion or regiment (brigade). Basically the artillery and the air force perform the mission.

The same procedure is used for close fire support of the offensive which extends to the full depth of the mission. Here the artillery destroys and captures barricaded strongpoints, reserves, and other targets obstructing the advance of offensive forces; the air forces conduct strikes against enemy installations and employ them against the enemy main force in support of offensive forces on the main axis.

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d) On the axes discussed, taking into consideration the Austrian defense concepts, increased attention needs to be directed to the following in the conduct of combat activities:

- after crossing the border in the enemy area security zone--depending on the grouping--very diversified employment of forces may become necessary. Thus, in addition to the advanced detachment and forward defenders, perhaps even instead of them, the main forces of divisions can be used;
- the seizure of key zones (areas of decisive importance) requires a breakthrough in the majority of cases, possibly from a march or after a brief preparation. The breakthrough has certain characteristics which must be seriously taken into consideration;
- for the organization of the breakthrough on short notice, 3 to 4 hours are necessary for a division, and 2 to 3 hours for a regiment. The breakthrough can be made variously in several terrain sectors, areas and times, and may be repeated several times in the depth;
- the front line density of the forces and means advantage per kilometer must be established not generally but concretely in proportion to the enemy defense and to the strength of his strongpoints and junctions on scattered axes, and appropriate to the defensive depth;
- employment of the forward detachment and the OMC becomes difficult in the operational depth, and their missions should be determined more circumspectly and more concretely;
- in many cases units and large units operate in a large region, thus, great care should be given to the direct support of their battle formation, as well as to the destruction of hostile forces remaining in the depth.

The latter requires the second echelon, combined arms reserves, or parts of them to receive specific missions in this regard.

The fundamental requirements are to infiltrate, outflank and penetrate the forces in depth; to break away boldly from heavy weaponry; to combat antitank means; to exploit the air dimension; and to develop a more flexible combat formation. At all times and in all places, let us use only as much force as is necessary to complete the mission. In the course of such action, troops used for support (flanks, depth, command posts, and commanders) will proportionately increase.

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Army Defense Reaching the Seacoast

The army defensive operation is part of the front offensive or defensive operation which according to objectives, missions, place and time--on the basis of a unified concept--is the sum total of coordinated defense engagements, battles, strikes, and maneuvers in cooperation with the tactical air force and other front operational elements for the purpose of disrupting the enemy offensive.

The army forces may go on the defensive:

- prior to or at the outset of combat activities;
- in the course of offensive operations;
- at the conclusion of the front offensive operation;
- on a coastal axis.

The army, in the course of, or at the end of its second operation, may reach the seacoast where it may shift to defense with partial or full strength, preparing for a hostile naval and airborne counterattack and its destruction.

In the front offensive units, on the Italian strategic axis, the army crossing the Alps in the Trieste-Venice terrain sector may shift to coastal defense. The purpose of this can be to secure the flank and the rear of the front offensive against probable strikes from above the sea. The army mission can be to prevent enemy naval and airborne assault landings; to repulse the enemy ground offensive along the seacoast or advancing into the depth of an area; to destroy enemy landing forces in cooperation with the tactical air force and missile units or with naval forces; and to hold captured territories.

Characteristics of coastal defense established in the sector under discussion will be:

- the sea and its coastal region significantly increase the resistance potential of defense;
- the organization of defense can occur generally without direct combat contact, but also during enemy strikes inflicted by various means;
- the wide expansion of defense will increase in significant measure because not all coastal areas are suitable for the landing of naval assault and other forces;

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
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- it is necessary to create a defensive structure fundamentally different from the offensive concentration;
- defense of the seacoast demands forces and means, and the defense of nearby islands as well as peninsulas used as harbors requires special attention;
- as a result of losses suffered in the course of several consecutive offensive operations, the density of troops and combat means will be low, as a matter of fact, some elements of the operational structure may be lacking;
- although the enemy needs considerable time for the preparation of a shore landing and deployment, he may not overlook the fact that for the organization of the defense and development of the defense system, only an exceptionally brief time is available.

In a defensive operation the army forces usually do not shift to defense all at once but gradually at various times, in order to push forward and clear the shore of the enemy, then the adjacent islands. In the event of passable approaches it is practical to deploy the army main forces in depth, preparing for the neutralization by counterattacks and counterstrikes of naval assaults pushing into the depth of the defense. In those approaches where geographic and navigation conditions encumber or render impossible the landing of enemy main assaults, it is practical to secure defense with subunit strongpoints or with reconnaissance and tactical patrols. It is advisable to defend in depth in the event of a short coastline; otherwise, in proximity to the coast. It is necessary to organize the fire system in the same way as the defense itself, echeloning [it] by axis and in depth, and by sector in order to assure the destruction of the enemy at sea, along the coast, and equally in depth.

The expansion of defense must unconditionally be made with attention devoted to the geographic and hydrometeorological conditions of the seacoast at the time of its organization. On the one hand, these conditions necessitate the dispersed deployment of forces and impede the maneuver of forces, and on the other hand, they constantly threaten the deployment areas with inundation by water. All of this requires individual engineering operations.

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The operation organized along the coast begins with strikes against naval assault landings and transportation means in assembly and embarkation areas, continues unabated on the sea, and concludes with the destruction of the landing forces. The basic mode of combat is gradual or part by part destruction of naval assault landings on each axis. From the outset it is necessary to contend with the enemy airborne assault landings and airmobile forces, which may be employed with the aim of isolating the second echelon and the reserves, thereby fragmenting the army defense. This will require their immediate destruction by nuclear strikes, or by the second echelon, or by special reserves.

In order to assure the destruction of assault landings and transportation means at the same time, it is expedient to launch nuclear and air strikes against naval assault landings as they begin surmounting antiassault landing obstacles and transports. By holding defense areas, by counterfire and by counterstrikes, fundamental deviations will not be present in coastal defense in the principles relating to use of reserves.

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PHASES OF ARMED HOSTS: STRATEGIC ACTIVITY
Any form - usually at military operations, combat activities and strikes
by the units and large units of military forces

<p>Activity of strategic nuclear forces.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - first and subsequent activity of strategic missile forces; - nuclear submarine strikes provided by ballistic missiles; - air operations of long-range aircraft. <p>Objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to achieve significant destruction of enemy military and economic base and forces in both the operational areas and operational theaters of operations. 	<p>Strategic operation in general theater of operations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - nuclear strikes of strategic nuclear forces; - front operations; - air operations with participation of air force; - military operations and combat action of strategic air force; - military operations and fleet combat action; - airborne operations; - combat action of naval air defense forces. <p>Objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - destruction of enemy military and economic base, depth of theater of operations, seizure of crucial areas of its territory, and withdrawal of enemy coalition states from the war. 	<p>Strategic operation in naval theater of operations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strikes of strategic nuclear forces; - naval operations of use of surface fleets, initiated with various aims; - air operations with participation of air force; - strategic air force combat action; - naval assault operations; - airborne operations; - combat action of the naval air defense forces. <p>Objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - destruction of enemy fleet strike forces; - destruction of enemy anti-submarine forces; - destruction of ocean transportation; - blockading of islands. 	<p>Strategic activities for repulse of enemy air and space attacks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - prevention of enemy air and space weapons attacks; - neutral action of the national air defense forces and fleet air defense forces; - combat action of missile defense higher units; - combat action of space defense higher units. <p>Objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - prevention of enemy actions directed at nation's political, administrative, and industrial centers, at command posts of armed forces and other important targets. 	<p>Air operations in general and naval theaters of operations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - destruction of enemy air force and nuclear missile bases; - destruction of important rear-area installations; - destruction of strategic and operational reserves; - obstruction of operational and strategic transportation; - disorganization of state and higher military leadership (only in periods of combat activity tagged by conventional means).
<p>Radioelectronic Warfare</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - is present in every sphere of armed conflict; - occurs simultaneously on the ground, in the air, in space, on and under water, independently of distance and geographic area; - can have an effect of decisive significance for any successful military action. 				

Attachment 1

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TIME PERIODS OF A "COLD WAR"
depending on the manner of outbreak, the nature of tasks facing the armed forces,
weapon types employed, sequence and dimensions of their deployment.

Time periods	Time spans	Characteristics
Time period of action with use of conventional arms. (optional)	Few days but can also be of a protracted nature.	<p>It can develop:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - as a result of expanding a local military conflict; - as a result of military action spreading to several important theaters. <p>Bitter conflict continues for seizing the initiative, assuring the success of military action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - destruction of main body of enemy air force and navy; - obtaining air superiority; - significant reduction of nuclear potential; - frustration of enemy efforts to halt the offensive. <p>Threat of enemy use of nuclear weapons is constant.</p> <p>There are more favorable conditions for mobilization and strategic deployment of armed forces.</p>
Time period of action with limited use of nuclear arms. (optional)	Presumably brief.	<p>Crisis situation, developed during action conducted with conventional means, results in conversion to action with nuclear arms.</p> <p>Conflict for seizure of initiative</p> <p>Nuclear arms launched against specified installations and forces on particular axes or in theaters of operations.</p> <p>Essentially tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons are deployed.</p> <p>Use of nuclear weapons, even in minimal measure, can immediately result in possibility of unlimited usage.</p> <p>In its course, a few nuclear strikes may be expected.</p>
Time period of action with limited use of nuclear arms.		<p>First strike of strategic nuclear forces will be decisive.</p> <p>Greater part of nuclear ordnance accumulated in peacetime will come into use.</p> <p>Effects of mass nuclear strikes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - combat capabilities for continuation of planned and organized combat actions very quickly diminish; - it is not improbable that in certain theaters and areas there will be no possibility for continuation of military actions for a long period.
Time period of following (concluding) military actions.	Can last a long time.	<p>Begins when both sides have already basic stockpiles of nuclear arms and have partially restored combat strength of forces.</p> <p>Success of action depends on which remaining forces should be used resolutely, expediently, and without delay.</p> <p>Rescue, emergency, restoration operations and reorganization of war production and transport are conducted in the interior of the country.</p>

Attachment 2

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[Legend to Attachment 3]:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. South Norway | 19. Italian Strategic Axis |
| 2. Northwestern Theater of Operations | 20. Belgrade |
| 3. North Britain | 21. Southwestern Theater of Operations |
| 4. Skagerrak Kattegat | 22. Iberian |
| 5. Leningrad | 23. Rome |
| 6. South Britain | 24. Sofia |
| 7. North Germany | 25. Gibraltar |
| 8. North German Strategic Axis | 26. North Africa |
| 9. Western Theater of Operations | 27. Greece |
| 10. English Channel | 28. Turkish |
| 11. South German Strategic Axis | 29. Ankara |
| 12. Kharkov | 30. Balkan Strategic Axis |
| 13. France (Central) | 31. Note:  Strategic Area |
| 14. South Germany | |
| 15. Central and South France | |
| 16. North Italy | |
| 17. Vienna | |
| 18. Budapest | |

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
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THEATERS OF OPERATIONS



Attachment 3

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[Legend to Attachment 4]:

- 1. Munich
- 2. Milan
- 3. Venice
- 4. Klagenfurt
- 5. Vienna
- 6. Moson
- 7. Sopron
- 8. Koszeg
- 9. Szombathely
- 10. Szentgotthard
- 11. Strategic Axes
- 12. Danube Valley Operational Axis
- 13. Italian Strategic Axis
- 14. North Italian Operational Axis
- 15. Belgrade

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
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Attachment 4

ITALIAN STRATEGIC AXIS



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[Legend to Attachment 5]:

[Left side of sketch]

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. KÖZ. KÖZP. | = admin center |
| 2. hdt. | = corps |
| 3. ho. | = division |
| 4. HDSCS. | = army group |
| 5. HDS. | = army |
| 6. dd. | = brigade |
| 7. HMCS. | = OMC |
| 8. "M" körzet | = "M" area |
| 9. Raktár, Rakt. | = depot |
| 10. FRONT TAVOLABBI FELADATA | = <u>front</u> secondary objective |

[Center of sketch]

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 11. HDS TAVOLABBI FELADATA | = army secondary objective |
| 12. IPARI KÖZP. | = industrial center |
| 13. pc. gr. ho. | = armored grenade launcher division |
| 14. e. | = regiment |
| 15. HDS KÖZELEBBI FELADATA | = army immediate objective |
| 16. FRONT KÖZELEBBI FELADATA | = <u>front</u> immediate objective |

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[Legend to Attachment 5 continued]:

[Right side of sketch]

- 17. TH. = reserve army
- 18. gl. ho. = motorized rifle division
- 19. gl. hk. e = mtr rifle and tank regiment
- 20. vre. = fighter air regiment
- 21. MÚT. 1. sz. = engr reserve, 1 co. [probable]
- 22. HDS. MRTB = army [expansion unknown]
- 23. rak. dd = rocket/missile brigade
- 24. HVP = army CP
- 25. VT. 1sz = [expansion unknown]
- 26. H. = army
- 27. Fré. e. = tactical air force regiment
- 28. HDS. MB = army [expansion unknown]
- 29. MZO 1 sz = mobile obstacle detachment, 1 co.
- 30. PET 1 sz = antic tank reserve, 1 co.
- 31. FHMCS = front OMG
- 32. FMB = front [expansion unknown]
- 33. FMRTB = front [expansion unknown]
- 34. HDS. T. gl. e.-2 = army reserve, 2 mtr rifle regiments
- 35. FR. rak. dd. = front missile brigade
- 36. vbre. e. = fighter-bomber air regiment


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[Legend to Attachment 5 continued]:

[Right side of sketch]

- 37. bre. e = bomber regiment
- 38. FMR = front [expansion unknown]
- 39. szre. e. = air transport regiment
- 40. ho. FR. T. = division of front missile reserve
- 41. FR. MRTB = [expansion unknown]
- 42. rak. o.-1 = 1 missile battalion

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
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Attachment 5

MISSIONS OF THE FRONT AND THE COMBINED ARMS ARMY



DIMENSIONS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATION
(In SM Theater of Operations)

A TÁMADÓ HADMŰVELET MÉRTEI:
(A DNY. megismerésén)

DESIGNATION	HDSNEVEZÉS	FRONT	HDS	ARMY
LINE OF ADVANCE	TÁMADÁSI ÉVY	300 - 400 km	100 - 120 km	
DEPTH OF OPERATION	HADMŰVELET MÉLYSÉGE	400 - 600 km	200 - 300 km	
THE SPAN OF OPERATION	HADMŰVELET HŐTARTÁMA	10-15 nap GAVS	10-15 nap GAVS	
DEPTH OF FIRST OBJECTIVE	ELSŐLEGGY FELADAT MÉLYSÉGE	200 - 300 km	120 - 150 km	
DEPTH OF FURTHER OBJECTIVE	TÁVOLLAGGI FELADAT MÉLYSÉGE	300 - 400 km	100 - 150 km	
RATE OF ADVANCE PER DAY	TÁMADÁSI HADMŰVÉSÉ	30-35 km/day	20-30 km/day	

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